The new plausibility standard14 with which courts now determine the adequacy of complaints disproportionately harms pro se litigants.15 First, the Supreme Court’s instruction that “conclusory” facts not be presumed true when determining a claim’s plausibility16 will affect those who (1) lack the resources to develop facts before discovery, (2) bring claims requiring them to plead information exclusively within the opposition’s possession, or (3) rely on forms in drafting complaints. Pro se litigants typify the parties who demonstrate all three behaviors. Second, determining whether the remaining allegations permit a plaus- ible inference of wrongdoing, as per the Supreme Court’s instruction,17 is a wildly subjective endeavor. Courts are likely—no doubt unintentionally—to draw inferences that disfavor pro se litigants because their “judicial common sense” judgments of what is plausible result from a drastically different set of background experiences and values.18 The admixture of these two steps portends serious trouble for pro se litigants, who, even before the plausibility standard, did not fare well de- spite the leeway afforded their complaints.19
Accordingly, this Comment reevaluates the effectiveness of liberal construction as a bulwark against premature dismissal of pro se com- plaints. Part I discusses pro se litigation generally. It documents the rise of the federal pro se docket, the reasons individuals choose to proceed pro se, and the unique challenges they face as a result of that choice. Because courts established liberal construction in response to those challenges, Part I ends by considering how this leniency oper- ates in practice. Part II examines in detail the new plausibility stan- dard articulated by the Supreme Court in Iqbal. Particularly, it dissects the Court’s two-pronged approach to demonstrate how each step is uniquely hostile to pro se litigants. This hostility explains the dispro- portionate impact that the decision has had and will continue to have on their complaints. Part III suggests a way to reinvigorate the leeway afforded pro se litigants and bring self-representation closer to epito- mizing our system’s goal of providing equal court access. Specifically, Part III advocates for (1) limiting disregard of “conclusory” factual al- legations in pro se pleadings and (2) increasing transparency with re- spect to the inferences drawn against pro se litigants.
Through advances in prenatal imaging and the field of immunology, the truly wondrous miracle that is pregnancy is now being more fully understood. Two aspects of pregnancy that your readers might be interested in knowing more about relate to the placenta and something known as fetomaternal microchimerism.
As many of your readers may know, the placenta is the organ through which the mother and prenatal child interface. The placenta is an organ that is attached to the inside of the uterus and connects to the prenatal child through the child’s umbilical cord.
What is not as well known about this organ is that the placenta is the only organ in human biology that is made by two persons, together, in cooperation. The placenta is ‘built’ from tissue that is part from mom, and part from the growing baby. Because of this, the placenta is referred to as a ‘feto-maternal’ organ. It is the only organ made by two people, in cooperation with providence. It is the first time mom and her baby come together, ...